The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [227]
In late 1995 and early 1996, in at least two more clandestine meetings in China with South Koreans, Hwang expressed grave concern about a dangerous shift of power in Pyongyang to the military. Hwang's views, made known to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, were reported to Washington via secret intelligence channels. His heightened apprehensions roughly coincided with the notable rise of military influence in the North under Kim Jong II, and the emergence in January 1996 of "Red Banner philosophy," emphasizing revolutionary and martial spirit, which quickly became more prominent than juche.
Hwang's first overt move of opposition, according to sources in Japan, had come in early February 1996, during an international seminar held in Moscow for delegates from thirty countries on "the , juche idea." In this setting the high priest of juche expressed his determined opposition to war, calling it inhuman and comparing military combatants to animals, and he declared his support for Chinese-style market reforms, which were still anathema in Pyongyang.
On March 10 Hwang's world began to change when an article in Nodong Sinmun attacked "careerists and conspirators [who] outwardly pretend to uphold the leader and be faithful to the revolutionary cause while dreaming another dream inwardly and making conspiracies behind the scenes." It warned that "socialism will go to ruin if there are careerists and conspirators seated in the leadership." Although the article was one of a continuing series of such warnings and mentioned no names, Hwang was certain it was aimed at him. Surveillance of his activities was increased, and lectures were organized that criticized his views and weakened his authority, again without specific mention of his name. He noticed that government officials began avoiding him.
Meanwhile, Hwang's aide in Beijing had been meeting Lee Yon Kil, a 69-year-old South Korean businessman, born in the North, who had been leading a personal crusade to induce and assist defectors from the communist regime since serving as a commando under U.S. and ROK direction in the Korean war. This shadowy figure had befriended reporter Kim Yong Sam of Monthly Chosun, the magazine of the Seoul newspaper Chosun Ilbo, who had had repeated contacts with him for several years and later reported on his talks with Hwang and his aide. On March 14 Lee heard the first indirect hints from Kim Duk Hong that Hwang might defect because of his opposition to military dominance and the growing possibility of war. On July 3, while transiting Beijing on his way home from leading the official DPRK delegation to a congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Hwang himself met Lee. "War must be prevented at any cost," Hwang told him, and to do so South Korea should provide food to the people of the North, which is "50 years behind the South" Hwang emphasized the need for absolute secrecy, telling Lee that a North Korean agent was situated deep in the "power core" of the Seoul regime. While in Pyongyang Hwang had been privy to a report by such an agent on personal remarks in Seoul by Kim Kwang 11, who was chief of staff to the ROK president at the time.
In the late spring, in an attempt to stabilize his position at home, Hwang had taken the advice of high-ranking party figures to compose a self-criticism admitting to mistakes. Toward the end of July, however, a private speech by Kim Jong II, published in the Workers Party theoretical journal Kulloja, returned to the attack against "social scientists" who erroneously interpreted juche. Hwang knew then that his self-criticism had been rejected, and that his ouster from the seat of power was inevitable. In Beijing Hwang's aide, Kim, spoke explicitly of defection for the first time on July 27 and reported that Hwang requested cyanide ampules in case suicide was his only option. He also asked for money to approach younger people in Pyongyang who he believed were less sympathetic to the regime. Hwang believes "North Korea is going opposite