The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [228]
Hwang now began to move decisively to the dissident camp. On August 21 he penned a lengthy treatise summing up his view that North Korea had become "neither a nationalist nor socialist state, but a fullfledged dictatorship" that "has nothing in common with the genuine juche idea." According to Hwang, "Anyone who conducts demonstrations or shows the slightest anti-government color, anyone who says or does anything humiliating the authority of the leader, is secretly shot to death.... From the intellectuals' standpoint, it can be said without hesitation that the entire country is a large prison."
As for Kim Jong Il, Hwang wrote that he "possesses vigorous energy, as well as unswerving will to protect his own interest. His political and artistic sense is very sharp, and his brain functions fast. Since he has only been worshipped by the people without being controlled by anyone, he has never experienced any hardships. As a result, he got to be impatient and has a violent character. He worshipped Germany's Hitler.... He never consults with anyone else. No one can make a direct telephone call to him, no matter how high his or her position is. He considers the party and military as his own and does not care about the national economy."
Regarding the possibility of war, Hwang wrote that "the North is developing nuclear, rocket and chemical weapons" and "believes it will win in a war." Therefore, he wrote, "the South should set up a social atmosphere of respecting the military; beef up military forces in all directions; and make impregnable readiness with proper preparations for war" in order to prevent armed conflict from breaking out. Reversing his previous stand, he wrote that to weaken the North, the South should discourage reforms in the DPRK. He advocated continuation of the economic blockade to isolate the North, with the exception of providing food and medicine for the North Korean people.
In mid-November Hwang hastily wrote three letters that were conveyed to Lee in Beijing. For the first time he identified February as a target date for defection and contemplated a postdefection future:
I have no desire for a political life in the South. If I had sought a political position, I would have gained more trust by using flattery in the North. I am old and have practically no aptitude for politics. I may be able to play an advisory role in this sector. I would like to spend the rest of my life simplifying the juche idea so that it is easier to understand for the people of the fatherland. I would also like to expend all my energy on avoiding the tragedy of fratricidal war to realize peaceful reunification.
All this time acting in his official capacity, Hwang continued to be the front man for the North Korean regime. In 1996, in his capacity as international affairs secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers Party, he received and exchanged views with thirty-six visiting delegations from Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North and South America, and led North Korean delegations to Vietnam in June and to Thailand and India in September. Officiating at the October 15 celebration of the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the Down-WithImperialism-Union, Hwang praised "Comrade Kim Jong 11 [who] with unbounded love for the people subordinates everything in the interests and demands of the people.... Trust and love is his political philosophy and political mode."
A final letter smuggled from Pyongyang, written on the evening of January 2, provided advice to the South from a Hwang who was now intensely concentrating on his future life. Because of its content, this controversial letter raised doubts about its authenticity when published by Chosun Ilbo immediately after Hwang's defection. In the letter Hwang advised the South to strengthen its military, its ruling party, and the NSP intelligence agency. The ruling party had been campaigning for, and the opposition