The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [247]
As partial compensation for the limits on his domestic missile programs, Kim proposed to Albright that other nations launch three or four North Korean scientific satellites per year into outer space, since the DPRK would no longer possess the rockets to do so itself. Such a possibility had been raised in general terms by U.S. negotiator Robert Einhorn in the bilateral missile talks a month after the August 1998 test, and also by Perry in his Pyongyang visit the following year. Kim Jong Il had first expressed interest in the idea during the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin in July 2000, in a remark that Putin was quick to pass on to Clinton and other world leaders and that quickly became the subject of public speculation.
The most important compensation, it was clear, would be the visit to North Korea of the president of the United States, which in its view would end its pariah status and be tangible acceptance of its legitimacy and sovereignty for all the world to see. Even more than economic or other benefits, this had been the central objective of North Korea, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 1993 Joint Declaration with the United States, including its "assurances against the threat and use of force" and its "mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs" had been a key factor in persuading North Korea not to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty [see pp. 285-86]. The Agreed Framework of 1994, which specifically endorsed the earlier declaration, created the first nonhostile relationship between the two countries and was instrumental in ending the nuclear crisis [see pp. 356-58]. William Perry's statements of U.S. acceptance of North Korea had been among the most important aspects of his proposals. Most recently, a U.S.-DPRK joint communique issued on October 12 at the conclusion of Vice Marshal Jo's visit to Washington declared that "neither government would have hostile intent toward the other" and "reaffirmed that their relations should be based on the principles of respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs." All these were commitments that Pyongyang took seriously (perhaps more seriously than the Americans who drafted them) but still they were mere words. From Pyongyang's standpoint, the presence of a U.S. president on its soil would go far beyond words to create a new fact of great importance.
Until the events of October, virtually no progress had been made in six years of talks about curbing North Korea's missiles. Suddenly the prospect of nearly limitless agreement had opened up at the eleventh hour of the Clinton administration, with only two weeks to go before the election of a new President and less than three months before Clinton would leave office. Although many concessions and compromises had been outlined by Kim Jong 11, most details remained to be worked out. As Albright knew from watching decades of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations, the devil is in the details, especially in such matters as limitations on weapons and the verification thereof. Among details to be ironed out were terms of compensation by the United States and other nations, precisely which weapons would be covered, what would happen to missiles already produced or deployed, and the whole issue of verification.
It was clear that Clinton could neither