The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [248]
It was not to be. Instead of learning the identity of the new president a few hours after the polls closed on November 7, the disputed election dragged on for five weeks in the state of Florida, and the attitude of Governor George W. Bush toward such an accord with North Korea was unknown. In the meantime, serious violence had erupted between Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East, creating the possibility of an emergency trip by Clinton to attempt to mediate. On the final weekend before the New Year of 2001, the State Department notified North Korea that Sherman would not be coming to try to close the deal, as it was now impossible for the outgoing US. president to travel to Pyongyang. Clinton telephoned Kim Dae Jung in Seoul to break the news, and the State Department notified all the other countries that had participated in the effort to capitalize on the dramatic opening in North Korea.
North Korean diplomats in New York expressed disappointment at the news, and said a great opportunity had been missed. Shortly before turning over her office to a new administration, Wendy Sherman received a New Year's card postmarked Pyongyang from Kang Sok Ju. It was the first such missive she had ever received from North Korea, and she took it as a positive sign.
On January 20, as Bill Clinton was turning over the U.S. presidency to George W Bush, Kim Jong Il was ending a six-day visit to China, his second in less than a year, during which he visited the Shanghai stock market and a General Motors joint-venture plant making Buicks in China's largest city. The bustling Shanghai Kim experienced, with its towering skyscrapers and torrid industrial pace, was a far cry from the city he had seen during his only previous visit there in 1983, near the start of China's market-oriented reforms. Beijing's Foreign Ministry spokesman said the North Korean leader praised what had been accomplished by policies of economic reform and opening up. At the dawn of 2001 there was widespread hope that Kim Jong Il would steer his country in the same direction.
AFTERWORD
t the beginning of the twenty-first century, the struggle on the Korean peninsula remains unresolved, yet at this writing, the two Koreas appear once again to be on the verge of change. In the year 2000, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's persistent and unwavering overtures to the North, combined with new policies of North Korea's leader, Kim Jong 11, produced the first peninsular summit meeting in the history of the two states, followed by substantial interaction in a variety of fields. In political terms, this change was the most significant since the Korean War half a century ago. If sustained, the surprising engagement has the capability of inaugurating a fundamentally new era in Korea and Northeast Asia.
It seems clear to me the two sides have reached a historical turning point in their relations, but it is not possible to forecast with any assurance the nature or even the direction of further change, whether toward greater cooperation or intensified hostility. I believe, however, that the future of their relationship is likely to be different from that of the past. To a greater degree than before, the two Koreas appear to have taken their fate into their own