The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [44]
Bonifas turned away from the North Korean officers, and Pak removed his watch, wrapped it in a handkerchief, and put it in his pocket. The other KPA officer rolled up his sleeves. Pak then shouted, "Chookyo!" (Kill!), and smashed Bonifas from behind with a karate chop, knocking him to the ground. This signaled a general KPA attack, first with fists and feet and then with clubs and iron pipes, which had been stored in the truck, and axes seized from the work party. Bonifas was beaten to death by five or six North Koreans wielding clubs and with the blunt edge of an ax. Lieutenant Mark Barrett, the other American officer present, tried to come to the aid of an enlisted man and was also knocked down and beaten to death. The South Korean interpreter was injured, along with four of the U.S. and ROK enlisted men. A U.S. Quick Reaction Force, which had been stationed nearby as a precaution, arrived after the fight had ended and the North Koreans had regrouped on their side of the lines. A camera with a telephoto lens, prepositioned following normal practice at a U.S. observation post, provided crucial evidence of the killings.
The deaths of the two American officers were the first fatalities in the Joint Security Area since it had been established at the end of the Korean War. Within days the killings would result in the gravest threat of all-out war from the 1953 armistice to the nuclear crisis of the 1990s. As in the nuclear crisis, Kim Il Sung showed his pragmatic side at the crucial moment, narrowly averting a widening clash. But the fact that the United States and North Korea were the principal actors left the leadership of South Korea on the sidelines and therefore far from satisfied with the outcome.
When news of the fatal skirmish reached the U.S. capital, President Ford was at the Republican National Convention in Kansas City, where he was competing for his party's presidential nomination against Ronald Reagan, who accused him of being too conciliatory to communists. In his absence, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger chaired the meeting of Washington Special Actions Group (WASAG), the top-level crisis committee of the Ford administration, in the White House Situation Room, the secure basement-level conference room replete with maps, briefing materials, and sophisticated communications.
A CIA briefer, making the initial presentation, noted there was no indication of North Korean troop movements or other preparations for a general attack. But he also expressed the view that the killings were not spontaneous. The agency submitted a written report, saying, "We are virtually certain that this incident was a deliberate provocation. We believe it was intended to support North Korea's diplomatic offensive against the US and South Korea ... and also to arouse US public opinion about the American troop presence in Korea during the presidential election campaign."
The chief of naval operations, Admiral James L. Holloway, representing the uniformed Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that given "a military stand-off' on the peninsula, a North Korean attack could be successful only if it was a surprise, and since the killings had put everyone on alert, "we therefore do not believe that the North had a major attack in mind."
As in many such emergencies, the policy makers had only a dim idea about how the clash had arisen. Neither the CIA nor other agencies at the table seemed