The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [45]
The U.S. policy makers did not discuss the broader background of sharply rising tension on the peninsula, which in retrospect was a crucial factor in the clash. Within a little more than a year, Defense Secretary Schlesinger had threatened North Korea with nuclear attack in response to ROK concern following the fall of Saigon; nuclearcapable F-111 swing-wing fighter-bombers, the most advanced in the American arsenal, had landed in South Korea for military exercises amid great publicity; and the United States and South Korea had staged Team Spirit 76, the first of a long-running series of large-scale joint manuevers east of Seoul. The parachute drops, amphibious land ings, and other maneuvers provoked a near-hysterical reaction from the North, which saw Team Spirit as a dress rehearsal for an invasion from the South.
On August 5, the day before the initial tree-cutting incident, North Korea had issued a lengthy government statement charging that the United States and South Korea were stepping up plans to invade the North. Pyongyang claimed they "have now finished war preparations and are going over to the adventurous machination to directly ignite the fuse of war." The declaration was highly unusual, being only the third official government statement on a Korea peninsular issue since the armistice. Puzzled, several American intelligence analysts attempted to have a warning sent to U.S. forces in Korea. However, this was not done. Instead, on August 6, the day following the alarmist statement from North Korea, the first abortive attempt was made to trim the poplar tree in the Joint Security Area.
For the policy makers in the White House meeting following the killings, the central topic was the means of retaliating against North Korea. Kissinger, who had spoken with Ford by telephone, was in a brutal mood. "The important thing is that they beat two Americans to death and must pay the price," the secretary of state announced. One participant in the meeting came out of it quoting Kissinger as saying, "North Korean blood must be spilled."
According to the minutes of the meeting, the discussion was remarkably free from many of the restraints that complicated U.S. policy making in other circumstances during the cold war. There was no expression of concern about the potential for touching off a wider war; nor was there any discussion of the likely reaction of China or the Soviet Union to an American action, although Kissinger met with the senior Chinese diplomat in Washington immediately after the meeting and issued a blunt warning through him to North Korea. Policymakers recognized a requirement to consult Japan under treaty arrangements about redeploying U.S. forces based on its territory, and Kissinger asked who would inform the South Korean president, but there was no discussion of the probable views of these Asian allies or the repercussions for them. As for Pyongyang's reaction, Kissinger observed that "it will be useful for us to generate enough activity so that the North Koreans begin to wonder what those crazy American bastards are doing or are capable of doing in this election year."
Even before the meeting was convened, General Richard Stilwell, the UN and U.S. commander in Korea, had recommended one potential response: to return to the JSA and cut down "the damned tree," as it was referred to during nearly all the governmental deliberations. This quickly won approval of the policy