The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [46]
While deciding on this massive show of American force in the area-and the felling of the tree-the WASAG meeting left undecided the punitive military action that Kissinger favored, and that he told the meeting Ford wished to explore. During the meeting Admiral Holloway suggested U.S. forces could lay mines or seize a North Korean ship. Another participant, according to Hyland, suggested that a nuclear weapon be exploded at sea near the North Korean coast as a warning. In discussion with Kissinger following the meeting, Hyland suggested an air strike in the eastern end of the DMZ, "where it would be unexpected and where it would not necessarily touch off something we couldn't handle." Kissinger seemed interested.
At Kissinger's request, the uniformed military explored two other options for punitive American actions to be taken at the time of the tree cutting. One was to destroy the nearby Bridge of No Return, across which prisoners of war had moved at end of the Korean War, by artillery fire, demolition charges, or precision guided missiles. The other option was an artillery attack against the DMZ barracks of the North Korean border guards. Both were strongly opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the grounds that they would put UN and ROK forces at the DMZ at great risk.
The JCS, however, told Kissinger it was exploring other punitive options to use "precision guided air munitions, surface-to-surface missiles, and unconventional warfare (SEAL) teams to destroy North Korean installations of military or infrastructure significance" after the tree felling was complete. "Henry thought we were being wimpish" by simply cutting down the tree, recalled National Security Adviser Scowcroft, who was with Ford in Kansas City but in constant touch with Kissinger. At a crucial point in the deliberations-after a second WASAG meeting to discuss U.S. responses-Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements and Admiral Holloway called at the White House to see Hyland, who recalled them "wringing their hands that we may be headed into another Korean War" by taking strong action. In a sentiment characteristic of many near the top of government, they told Hyland, "These [North] Koreans are wild people."
In the end, Ford decided against any military reprisals because of their potential for escalation into a general war on the Korean peninsula. He explained later, "In the case of Korea to gamble with an overkill might broaden very quickly into a full military conflict, but responding with an appropriate amount of force would be effective in demonstrating U.S. resolve."
While the United States was pondering its course, the rival Korean states were reacting in very different ways. In response to the upgrading of American and South Korean alert status, North Korean radio broke into regular programming to announce that the entire army and reserve force was being placed into "full combat readiness." A strict blackout was imposed in Pyongyang, and the populace was crowded into underground shelters as air raid sirens wailed. Front-line troops were prepared for battle. From the DMZ to the capital, senior North Korean officials were evacuated into previously prepared and fortified tunnels.
Foreign Minister Ho Dam, speaking at a summit meeting of the nonaligned movement in Sri Lanka, depicted the ax killings as "intentional provocative acts against our side in the joint guard area of Panmunjom" intended to "directly set fire on the fuse of war." While keeping up a bellicose stand publicly, North