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By Root 1877 0

"review" was hardly under way before Carter sent Vice President Walter Mondale to Tokyo, at the end of January, to inform the Japanese of his determination to withdraw American ground troops over a period of years. Publicly the Japanese were understanding, but privately they were deeply worried about the potential for a general American pullback to affect their own security. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Morton Abramowitz, a career holdover from previous administrations who accompanied Mondale on the trip, argued it was a serious mistake to move so quickly and especially not to fly on to Seoul to inform South Korean leaders in person of the decision, which was bound to be deeply upsetting. Summing up his strong belief, Abramowitz, who later loyally defended in public the policy he opposed in private, told Mondale, "We can't withdraw." The new vice president retorted breezily, "Hey, Mort, there's been an election."

On February 15, Carter sent a letter to South Korean president Park Chung Hee affirming the U.S. commitment to ROK security but broaching the issue of troop withdrawals and urging him to take steps to improve his human rights posture. The letter was presented to Park by Ambassador Richard Sneider and General John Vessey, the U.S. military commander in Seoul. Vessey, who had met Carter in the White House a few days before, said no decision had been made about withdrawal of American troops. Moreover, Vessey said Carter asked him to convey to Park that he "would make no changes in the troop deployments until after careful consultations with President Park." Park, citing many press stories about withdrawal plans, asked that quiet consultations begin very soon.

In early March, when ROK foreign minister Park Tong Chin came to Washington to begin the consultations, however, he found a U.S. president whose mind was made up. In a handwritten memo to Brzezinski and Vance on March 5, shortly before meeting the Korean minister, Carter said bluntly that Park must understand:

a) American forces will be withdrawn. Air cover will be continued.

b) US-Korean relations as determined by Congress and American people are at an all time low ebb.

c) Present military aid support and my reticence on human rights issue will be temporary unless Park voluntarily adopts some open change re political prisoners.

In the talking points for the meeting sent to Carter by Brzezinski, it was suggested that Carter justify his decision by saying, "In view of the expansion in South Korea's economy and military strength as well as the apparent desire of all the great powers to avoid war on the peninsula, our ground forces will be withdrawn." Minister Park, however, recalled that Carter's main justification was that "troop withdrawal is my campaign pledge." The meeting made it crystal clear that Carter was determined to go ahead with the withdrawal. Carter also said that the withdrawal would be gradual and that Washington would support the strengthening of South Korean defense capabilities to compensate for the American troop cutbacks.

Before he became president, Carter said he would seek guarantees of South Korea's security from China and the Soviet Union, before making a decision to withdraw troops. In fact, he did not. As late as mid-June 1977, well after the withdrawal plan had been established and announced, the administration still had not provided even an authoritative briefing for the Chinese and Soviets on what the United States had in mind.

In July 1977, Vance wrote in a memorandum to Carter that a diplomatic initiative involving the two Koreas with possible Chinese participation was "the missing dimension in our troop withdrawal policy." Carter responded favorably, and the State Department was authorized to begin consultations initially with Seoul and then with Beijing on a possible four-power conference to seek a political settlement on the peninsula. Vance took up the proposal with Foreign Minister Huang Hua on a trip to Beijing in late August but met with no enthusiasm from the Chinese side. There the idea seems