The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [52]
Carter had declared during the presidential campaign that "we've got 700 atomic weapons in Korea. I see no reason for a single one." (According to government documents, there were actually 683 warheads in South Korea at the time, remarkably close to Carter's statement.) His plan had been to order their removal as the first order of business. Defense Secretary Harold Brown, a physicist and nuclear expert, spearheaded a successful drive to persuade Carter to consider the removal of nuclear weapons along with, rather than ahead of, withdrawal of U.S. troops, lest sudden action in this sensitive area destabilize the situation on the Korean peninsula.
Carter's iron-willed resolve to move ahead posed an ethical and professional dilemma for many officials of his government, who believed in loyalty to presidential decisions yet who increasingly believed Carter's policy courted unnecessary and possibly unacceptable political and military risks. Unlike the classic Washington struggle of contending forces within the executive branch engaged in "a battle for the president's mind," this came to be "a battle against the president's mind." There were increasingly explicit private conversations among the conspirators, who might have been fired if their conniving had come to light. According to Richard Holbrooke, who was assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs and in the middle of the battle, it was "a full-scale rebellion against the president." Somehow news correspondents covering the administration, including me, never grasped the full extent of the guerrilla war within the administration.
Facing fundamental questions of loyalty and responsibility, Brown's guideline was to "obey direct orders, but otherwise try to turn the president around." The most difficult thing for Brown was defending a policy in public that he opposed in private. Vance, who resigned on principle in 1980 in opposition to the hostage rescue mission in Iran, was able to maneuver within the limits of his conscience on the Korea withdrawal, keeping his misgivings to himself while vowing that he had to "find a way to change the president's mind." Brzezinski, who knew better than anyone else that Carter's view on the Korean issue was "strongly held, almost emotional," stuck with the president in high-level meetings until the bitter end, although he did nothing to stop the maneuvering of others to thwart Carter's idea.
On the military side, the politically appointed Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the withdrawal policy on condition that American support elements remain and that South Korea receive adequate compensation for the reduction in American strength. The officers in the field, however, did not disguise their opposition. Major General John Singlaub, the chief of staff of the U.S. Command in Korea, told Washington Post correspondent John Saar that "if U.S. ground troops are withdrawn on the schedule suggested, it will lead to war." Stung by what he considered military insubordination, Carter summoned Singlaub to the White House, reprimanded him, and summarily removed him from Korea, reassigning him to a domestic post. The Singlaub episode created a political storm, deepening the controversy over the withdrawal plan.
The initial tactic of the internal opposition to the pullout was to seek to delay, modify, and water down the plans so that initial withdrawals would be minor, with lots of room for reflection and reversal. Carter, however, insisted on pushing ahead. In early May he signed a top-secret order containing a clear timetable: one brigade of the Second Division-at least 6,000 troops-was to be withdrawn by the end of 1978; a second brigade and its support elements-at least 9,000 troops-was to be withdrawn by the end of June 1980. American nuclear weapons in Korea were to be reduced and eventually removed along with the troops. Undersecretary of State Philip Habib, formerly U.S. ambassador to