The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [72]
In conversation with Gleysteen, Chun blamed the unrest on "a small number" of student radicals, professors, and ambitious politicians. He described the situation as not critical and said military force would be used only as a last resort. Wickham, meeting with the ROK defense minister and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the same day, emphasized the dangers of escalation if troops were used against civilians. The exchanges left Gleysteen with the impression that the student demonstrations might be handled with moderation, although they were reaching massive proportions and becoming larger by the day.
On May 13, however, Chun suddenly played the North Korean card, telling Wickham that Pyongyang was the "hidden hand" behind the students and that the decisive moment for a North Korean attack on the South might have arrived. Wickham reported to Washington that Chun's stress on danger from the North appeared to be a pretext for a move into the Blue House. American scrutiny of its intelligence turned up no sign of preparations for attack, and the State Department, concerned about rumors in Seoul, made a public statement to that effect. Years later a Korean military intelligence officer said he had been ordered by officials close to Chun to fabricate the supposed threat.
On the night of May 17 and the early morning hours of May 18, military authorities began widespread arrests of student leaders and senior political figures, including the three most likely candidates for president, the "three Kims"-opposition leaders Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam and former prime minister Kim Jong Pil. All political activity was banned under a declaration of full martial law, as opposed to the partial martial law that had previously been in effect. The National Assembly was closed at bayonet point, and heavy censorship was reimposed on the Korean press. The army seized control, occupied many campuses, and closed all universities.
Gleysteen reported to Washington that the actions meant that "the military [have] all but formally taken over the country." In a "flash" cable, reserved for communications of the highest urgency, he declared that "the military leaders have shown disregard for constituted authority in the ROK-and for us. We have been presented with a fait accompli suggesting that the military leaders either do not know or care about the consequences of treating us in this manner." The ambassador, presenting sharp protests to President Choi and to the army chief of staff, said the United States found the actions "shocking and astounding." The CIA station chief in Seoul, Bob Brewster, made a similar protest to Chun. The State Department issued an unusually strong statement about an American ally, saying the United States was "deeply disturbed" and concerned that the use of military force will "exacerbate problems" in Korea.
One of the most serious issues was the fate of late President Park's old rival and nemesis, Kim Dae Jung. Because of his spectacular kidnapping from Tokyo by KCIA agents in 1973 and his subsequent persecution by the Park government, the opposition figure and former presidential candidate was better known abroad than any other living South Korean. At home he inspired passionate loyalty, especially among the regional constituents in his native Cholla provinces, but also fierce antipathy among conservatives, especially in the military. His release from house arrest and reemergence to prominence after