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By Root 1951 0

and spent a career in the CIA before becoming an ambassador, presented Chun with the letter. Aware that the situation was extremely serious, Lilley had met beforehand with the U.S. military commander in Korea, General William J. Livesey, and obtained his verbal agreement that the use of military force was undesirable in the political crisis. Armed with this assurance, Lilley went beyond the gentle language of the Reagan letter to warn that intervention by the military would stretch the alliance in dangerous fashion and court a repeat of the damaging events of the 1980 Kwangju uprising. "This is the American position. The [U.S. military] command is with me. I speak for all of the United States," Lilley declared. Chun, who by that stage of his presidency often monopolized meetings with visitors, this time listened intently. He did not say what he would do, but he left Lilley with the belief that the presentation had made a serious impression. About an hour after Lilley left the Blue House, aides to Chun were told that the mobilization order had been suspended. Chun had put his sword back into the scabbard and turned to a political solution.

How much of a role the United States played in staying Chun's hand is difficult to determine. At the time and in retrospect, American officials gave principal credit to Koreans, while acknowledging that Washington played a supporting role. This view is given considerable credence by former general Chung Ho Yong, one of the inner circle of the Chun-Roh group of military leaders. Chung had resigned as minister of home affairs the month before the June crisis and would become defense minister after it was over. According to Chung, he was visited by younger generals and colonels who were alarmed by the extensive preparations that had been made to use force against the demonstrations. These military leaders-like the rest of society-thought the demonstrators had a just cause and that a crackdown would be a disaster. Chung took their concerns to Roh, telling him that the use of the military would have grave consequences for society and Roh's own political future. According to Chung, Roh saw the president within hours and strongly recommended against using military force. Roh recalled in an interview for this book that at that "very difficult moment," he had taken his opposition directly to the president. Of crucial importance, he said, was that "the military themselves felt the army should not be mobilized," which was a significant sign of the growing maturity of the ROK armed forces. Another Korean official close to the situation said Reagan's letter added to the impact of advice from a senior aide to Chun that if he put tanks and troops into the streets, the military commanders might develop a mind of their own about the uses of their power, much as Chun had challenged his own seniors and gained control of Seoul in December 1979.

After June 19 emphasis shifted from the streets to a negotiating track. On June 21 the National Assembly members of the ruling party held an unusual day-long caucus, at which the issue of compliance with the opposition demand for direct presidential elections was seriously raised and extensively discussed for the first time. On June 22, Chun announced a plan to meet opposition leader Kim Young Sam to seek a political solution to the crisis. Surprisingly, the two men had never met. After negotiations about the terms, the meeting took place on June 24 but ended without agreement.

On June 25, Assistant Secretary of State Gaston Sigur, who had peeled off from a Shultz trip in Australia shortly after the presentation of the Reagan letter, met Chun to observe the political situation firsthand and to reiterate that military force should not be used. Sigur found a distraught and nervous Chun, quite unlike the confident and decisive leader he had known before. While Chun did not confide his views about settlement of the crisis, he made it dramatically clear he would not seek to stay in office. "Don't you think I know what my people think about me? They don't want me in