The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [98]
On June 29, Roh stunned Koreans by accepting the central opposition demand and agreeing to the direct election of the next president-a daring move in view of the unpopularity of the ruling party. Roh's eight-point program also advocated a complete amnesty for Kim Dae Jung, freedom of expression for the tightly controlled press, and autonomy for the nation's closely monitored colleges and universities. According to a key adviser, Roh came close to advocating an official apology for the Kwangju massacre but backed away at the last minute due to concern about the military reaction. Roh made his startling announcement in the form of recommendations to Chun, whose views were not immediately known but who endorsed Roh's program two days later.
In the national jubilation that followed, Roh was acclaimed a hero by many Koreans, especially since there was widespread speculation that he had taken the bold steps with only grudging assent from Chun. The president said nothing to refute this belief and steadfastly refused to discuss his role in Roh's decisions. In early 1992, more than four years later, Chun's former press secretary published detailed notes of presidential conversations from June 1987, indicating that Chun had originated the decision to accept direct elections and arranged for Roh to take the credit in order to enhance his candidacy. Late in 1996, Lee Soon Ja (Mrs. Chun) said much the same in a document presented to a Seoul court. Whatever the true origin of Roh's dramatic reversal, it ended the crisis of June 1987 and put South Korea decisively on the path to political reform.
THE ELECTION OF 1987
The South Korean election of December 1987, coming on the heels of the political breakthrough of June, was the first popular balloting for president since President Park Chung Hee's narrow victory in 1971. Roh Tae Woo was praised for his summertime role in agreeing to a direct presidential election, but it was widely assumed that he could not win in December because of his military background. Military rule was just too unpopular, as was the would-be kingmaker, Chun. The president, on the other hand, was confident. Even before Roh's dramatic June 29 declaration, Chun told aides he had no worry that the ruling party would lose a popular vote "because the government has made numerous accomplishments and the economy is doing well." He also began to believe that clashes between the two most important opposition figures would sap their strength.
Indeed, a central problem for the opposition, as had often been the case before, was the presence of two powerful leaders who were rivals more than colleagues, each with a different geographical and political base. Both Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung were civilian leaders who had long been persecuted while carrying the banners of political opposition and democracy. Together they represented a formidable force, but the big question was whether they could work together.
I was in Seoul that August and took the opportunity to meet separately with Roh and the two Kims, all of whom I had known for years.
The meeting with Roh took place amid the trappings of his political power in the spacious corner office he occupied in the National Assembly building as leader of the ruling party. Since our lengthy first meeting in 1980, I had seen him several times in his different civilian capacities in Washington and Seoul, and it seemed to me this time he was more articulate as well as a bit grayer. Wearing a conservative business suit, he nevertheless hooked his thumbs into his belt as we talked, as if he missed his uniform. When I reminded him of his statement at our first meeting