TIMAEU [6]
and thenceforward we will speak of them as
Athenians and fellow-citizens.
Soc. I see that I shall receive in my turn a perfect and splendid
feast of reason. And now, Timaeus, you, I suppose, should speak
next, after duly calling upon the Gods.
Tim. All men, Socrates, who have any degree of right feeling, at the
beginning of every enterprise, whether small or great, always call
upon God. And we, too, who are going to discourse of the nature of the
universe, how created or how existing without creation, if we be not
altogether out of our wits, must invoke the aid of Gods and
Goddesses and pray that our words may be acceptable to them and
consistent with themselves. Let this, then, be our invocation of the
Gods, to which I add an exhortation of myself to speak in such
manner as will be most intelligible to you, and will most accord
with my own intent.
First then, in my judgment, we must make a distinction and ask, What
is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is
always becoming and never is? That which is apprehended by
intelligence and reason is always in the same state; but that which is
conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason, is
always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is. Now
everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be created
by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be created. The work of
the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the
form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must
necessarily be made fair and perfect; but when he looks to the created
only, and uses a created pattern, it is not fair or perfect. Was the
heaven then or the world, whether called by this or by any other
more appropriate name-assuming the name, I am asking a question
which has to be asked at the beginning of an enquiry about
anything-was the world, I say, always in existence and without
beginning? or created, and had it a beginning? Created, I reply, being
visible and tangible and having a body, and therefore sensible; and
all sensible things are apprehended by opinion and sense and are in
a process of creation and created. Now that which is created must,
as we affirm, of necessity be created by a cause. But the father and
maker of all this universe is past finding out; and even if we found
him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible. And there is still
a question to be asked about him: Which of the patterns had the
artificer in view when he made the world-the pattern of the
unchangeable, or of that which is created? If the world be indeed fair
and the artificer good, it is manifest that he must have looked to
that which is eternal; but if what cannot be said without blasphemy is
true, then to the created pattern. Every one will see that he must
have looked to, the eternal; for the world is the fairest of creations
and he is the best of causes. And having been created in this way, the
world has been framed in the likeness of that which is apprehended
by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and must therefore of
necessity, if this is admitted, be a copy of something. Now it is
all-important that the beginning of everything should be according
to nature. And in speaking of the copy and the original we may
assume that words are akin to the matter which they describe; when
they relate to the lasting and permanent and intelligible, they
ought to be lasting and unalterable, and, as far as their nature
allows, irrefutable and immovable-nothing less. But when they
express only the copy or likeness and not the eternal things
themselves, they need only be likely and analogous to the real
words. As being is to becoming, so is truth to belief. If then,
Socrates, amid the many opinions about the gods and the generation
of the universe, we are not able to give notions which are
altogether and in every respect exact and consistent with one another,
do not be surprised. Enough, if we adduce
Athenians and fellow-citizens.
Soc. I see that I shall receive in my turn a perfect and splendid
feast of reason. And now, Timaeus, you, I suppose, should speak
next, after duly calling upon the Gods.
Tim. All men, Socrates, who have any degree of right feeling, at the
beginning of every enterprise, whether small or great, always call
upon God. And we, too, who are going to discourse of the nature of the
universe, how created or how existing without creation, if we be not
altogether out of our wits, must invoke the aid of Gods and
Goddesses and pray that our words may be acceptable to them and
consistent with themselves. Let this, then, be our invocation of the
Gods, to which I add an exhortation of myself to speak in such
manner as will be most intelligible to you, and will most accord
with my own intent.
First then, in my judgment, we must make a distinction and ask, What
is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is
always becoming and never is? That which is apprehended by
intelligence and reason is always in the same state; but that which is
conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason, is
always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is. Now
everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be created
by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be created. The work of
the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the
form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must
necessarily be made fair and perfect; but when he looks to the created
only, and uses a created pattern, it is not fair or perfect. Was the
heaven then or the world, whether called by this or by any other
more appropriate name-assuming the name, I am asking a question
which has to be asked at the beginning of an enquiry about
anything-was the world, I say, always in existence and without
beginning? or created, and had it a beginning? Created, I reply, being
visible and tangible and having a body, and therefore sensible; and
all sensible things are apprehended by opinion and sense and are in
a process of creation and created. Now that which is created must,
as we affirm, of necessity be created by a cause. But the father and
maker of all this universe is past finding out; and even if we found
him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible. And there is still
a question to be asked about him: Which of the patterns had the
artificer in view when he made the world-the pattern of the
unchangeable, or of that which is created? If the world be indeed fair
and the artificer good, it is manifest that he must have looked to
that which is eternal; but if what cannot be said without blasphemy is
true, then to the created pattern. Every one will see that he must
have looked to, the eternal; for the world is the fairest of creations
and he is the best of causes. And having been created in this way, the
world has been framed in the likeness of that which is apprehended
by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and must therefore of
necessity, if this is admitted, be a copy of something. Now it is
all-important that the beginning of everything should be according
to nature. And in speaking of the copy and the original we may
assume that words are akin to the matter which they describe; when
they relate to the lasting and permanent and intelligible, they
ought to be lasting and unalterable, and, as far as their nature
allows, irrefutable and immovable-nothing less. But when they
express only the copy or likeness and not the eternal things
themselves, they need only be likely and analogous to the real
words. As being is to becoming, so is truth to belief. If then,
Socrates, amid the many opinions about the gods and the generation
of the universe, we are not able to give notions which are
altogether and in every respect exact and consistent with one another,
do not be surprised. Enough, if we adduce