TIMAEU [7]
probabilities as likely as
any others; for we must remember that I who am the speaker, and you
who are the judges, are only mortal men, and we ought to accept the
tale which is probable and enquire no further.
Soc. Excellent, Timaeus; and we will do precisely as you bid us. The
prelude is charming, and is already accepted by us-may we beg of you
to proceed to the strain?
Tim. Let me tell you then why the creator made this world of
generation. He was good, and the good can never have any jealousy of
anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all things
should be as like himself as they could be. This is in the truest
sense the origin of creation and of the world, as we shall do well
in believing on the testimony of wise men: God desired that all things
should be good and nothing bad, so far as this was attainable.
Wherefore also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but
moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he
brought order, considering that this was in every way better than
the other. Now the deeds of the best could never be or have been other
than the fairest; and the creator, reflecting on the things which
are by nature visible, found that no unintelligent creature taken as a
whole was fairer than the intelligent taken as a whole; and that
intelligence could not be present in anything which was devoid of
soul. For which reason, when he was framing the universe, he put
intelligence in soul, and soul in body, that he might be the creator
of a work which was by nature fairest and best. Wherefore, using the
language of probability, we may say that the world became a living
creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of
God.
This being supposed, let us proceed to the next stage: In the
likeness of what animal did the Creator make the world? It would be an
unworthy thing to liken it to any nature which exists as a part
only; for nothing can be beautiful which is like any imperfect
thing; but let us suppose the world to be the very image of that whole
of which all other animals both individually and in their tribes are
portions. For the original of the universe contains in itself all
intelligible beings, just as this world comprehends us and all other
visible creatures. For the Deity, intending to make this world like
the fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings, framed one
visible animal comprehending within itself all other animals of a
kindred nature. Are we right in saying that there is one world, or
that they are many and infinite? There must be one only, if the
created copy is to accord with the original. For that which includes
all other intelligible creatures cannot have a second or companion; in
that case there would be need of another living being which would
include both, and of which they would be parts, and the likeness would
be more truly said to resemble not them, but that other which included
them. In order then that the world might be solitary, like the perfect
animal, the creator made not two worlds or an infinite number of them;
but there is and ever will be one only-begotten and created heaven.
Now that which is created is of necessity corporeal, and also
visible and tangible. And nothing is visible where there is no fire,
or tangible which has no solidity, and nothing is solid without earth.
Wherefore also God in the beginning of creation made the body of the
universe to consist of fire and earth. But two things cannot be
rightly put together without a third; there must be some bond of union
between them. And the fairest bond is that which makes the most
complete fusion of itself and the things which it combines; and
proportion is best adapted to effect such a union. For whenever in any
three numbers, whether cube or square, there is a mean, which is to
the last term what the first term is to it; and again, when the mean
is to the first term as the last term is to the mean-then the mean
becoming first
any others; for we must remember that I who am the speaker, and you
who are the judges, are only mortal men, and we ought to accept the
tale which is probable and enquire no further.
Soc. Excellent, Timaeus; and we will do precisely as you bid us. The
prelude is charming, and is already accepted by us-may we beg of you
to proceed to the strain?
Tim. Let me tell you then why the creator made this world of
generation. He was good, and the good can never have any jealousy of
anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all things
should be as like himself as they could be. This is in the truest
sense the origin of creation and of the world, as we shall do well
in believing on the testimony of wise men: God desired that all things
should be good and nothing bad, so far as this was attainable.
Wherefore also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but
moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he
brought order, considering that this was in every way better than
the other. Now the deeds of the best could never be or have been other
than the fairest; and the creator, reflecting on the things which
are by nature visible, found that no unintelligent creature taken as a
whole was fairer than the intelligent taken as a whole; and that
intelligence could not be present in anything which was devoid of
soul. For which reason, when he was framing the universe, he put
intelligence in soul, and soul in body, that he might be the creator
of a work which was by nature fairest and best. Wherefore, using the
language of probability, we may say that the world became a living
creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of
God.
This being supposed, let us proceed to the next stage: In the
likeness of what animal did the Creator make the world? It would be an
unworthy thing to liken it to any nature which exists as a part
only; for nothing can be beautiful which is like any imperfect
thing; but let us suppose the world to be the very image of that whole
of which all other animals both individually and in their tribes are
portions. For the original of the universe contains in itself all
intelligible beings, just as this world comprehends us and all other
visible creatures. For the Deity, intending to make this world like
the fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings, framed one
visible animal comprehending within itself all other animals of a
kindred nature. Are we right in saying that there is one world, or
that they are many and infinite? There must be one only, if the
created copy is to accord with the original. For that which includes
all other intelligible creatures cannot have a second or companion; in
that case there would be need of another living being which would
include both, and of which they would be parts, and the likeness would
be more truly said to resemble not them, but that other which included
them. In order then that the world might be solitary, like the perfect
animal, the creator made not two worlds or an infinite number of them;
but there is and ever will be one only-begotten and created heaven.
Now that which is created is of necessity corporeal, and also
visible and tangible. And nothing is visible where there is no fire,
or tangible which has no solidity, and nothing is solid without earth.
Wherefore also God in the beginning of creation made the body of the
universe to consist of fire and earth. But two things cannot be
rightly put together without a third; there must be some bond of union
between them. And the fairest bond is that which makes the most
complete fusion of itself and the things which it combines; and
proportion is best adapted to effect such a union. For whenever in any
three numbers, whether cube or square, there is a mean, which is to
the last term what the first term is to it; and again, when the mean
is to the first term as the last term is to the mean-then the mean
becoming first