War and Peace - Leo Tolstoy [852]
The head of the garrison at Glogau, with ten thousand men, asks the King of Prussia what to do if he is invited to surrender…All this is undeniable.
In short, hoping to impress only by our military bearing, it turns out that we find ourselves at war in earnest, and what’s more, at war on our own frontiers with and for the King of Prussia. We have everything, we only lack one little thing, a commander in chief. Since it has been found that the successes at Austerlitz would have been more decisive if the commander in chief had been less young, they make a review of all the octogenarians and, between Prozorovsky and Kamensky, give the preference to the latter. The general comes to us in a kibitka, like Suvorov, and is welcomed with acclamations of joy and triumph.
On the 4th the first mail arrives from Petersburg. The pouches are taken to the office of the marshal, who likes doing everything himself. I am sent for to help sort the letters and take those intended for us. The marshal watches us work and waits for the packets addressed to him. We search—there aren’t any. The marshal grows impatient, sets to work himself, and finds letters from the Emperor to Count T., to Prince V. and others. Then he gets into one of his blue fits. He breathes fire and flame on everybody, seizes the letters, unseals them, and reads those the Emperor has addressed to others…And he writes the famous order of the day to General Bennigsen.
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*313He wrote to the Emperor.
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†314The marshal is angry with the Emperor and is punishing us all; isn’t that logical!
There you have the first act. In those that follow the interest and the ridiculousness increase, as you might expect. After the marshal’s departure, it turns out that we are in sight of the enemy and must offer battle. Buxhöwden is commander in chief by right of seniority, but General Bennigsen is not of that opinion; the more so as it is he with his corps that is in sight of the enemy, and he wants to profit from the occasion of a battle “on his own hand,” as the Germans say. He offers it. This is the battle of Pultusk, which is considered to be a great victory, but which in my opinion is not one at all. We muftis have, as you know, a very nasty habit of deciding the winning or losing of a battle. He who retreats after the battle has lost it, that’s what we say, and on that head we have lost the battle of Pultusk. In short, we retreat after the battle, but we sent a courier to Petersburg with news of a victory, and the general does not yield up the chief command to Buxhöwden, hoping to receive from Petersburg the title of commander in chief in recognition of his victory. During this interregnum, we begin an excessively interesting and original plan of maneuvres. Our aim does not consist, as it should, of evading or attacking the enemy; but solely of evading General Buxhöwden, who by right of seniority should be our chief. We pursue this goal with so much energy that in crossing a river that is not fordable, we burn our bridges to separate ourselves from the enemy, who for the moment is not Bonaparte but Buxhöwden. General Buxhöwden was nearly attacked and taken by superior enemy forces because of one of our pretty maneuvres that saved us from him. Buxhöwden pursues us—we slip away. He has barely crossed to our side of the river, when we cross back again. In the end our enemy Buxhöwden catches us and attacks us. The two generals become angry. There is even a challenge to a duel on Buxhöwden’s part and an attack of epilepsy on Bennigsen’s part. But at the critical moment, the courier who brought the news of our victory at Pultusk brings us from Petersburg our nomination as commander in chief, and the first enemy, Buxhöwden, is sunk: