Whirlwind - Barrett Tillman [145]
253 In June 1944: For joint air defense areas: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific): Japanese Airpower: Weapons and Tactics (Washington, DC: Military Analysis Division, January 1947), map, 58.
254 A major part of the problem: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific): Japanese Airpower; Weapons and Tactics (Washington, DC: Military Analysis Division, July 1946).
254 “very poor”: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific): Japanese Airpower, ibid., 26.
255 “In order to overcome”: Air Combat Regulations, Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order 86, mid-1944, via David C. Dickson, December 2007, http://indoctrine.googlepages.com/operationsordersandorders, 1941–45.
255 “Why do we need radar?”: Max Hastings, Bomber Command: The Myths and Reality of the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939–45 (New York: Dial, 1979), 47.
255 From 1940 onward: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics, 71.
256 “The Japanese fighter defense”: Japanese Airpower, 51.
256 “Those responsible for control”: Assistant Chief of Air Staff–Intelligence, HQ AAF, Mission Accomplished: Interrogations of Japanese Industrial, Military, and Civil Leaders, Washington, DC, 1946, 51.
256 Germany’s toll: Estimates for German bombing victims run from 305,000 to nearly 600,000. See John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin, 1989); and Stephen Budiansky, Air Power (New York: Viking, 2004), 330.
257 “Day by day”: Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny: My Struggle for Peace (London: Hutchinson, 1958).
257 “the enemy’s offensive operations”: Onishi statement courtesy of Dr. M. G. Sheftall, 2008.
257 “we must fight”: Alvin Coox, Japan: The Final Agony (New York: Ballantine, 1970), 99.
258 “The gawkers”: E-mail to author from Dr. M. G. Sheftall, March 2008.
261 After 1945: For evaluations of the Anglo-American air campaign, see Alan J. Levine, The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940–1945 (Westport: Greenwood, 1992), 216. Also see Alfred C. Mierzejewski, The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944–45 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 121.
261 “The myth”: Max Hastings, Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944–45 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), xix. Another important factor, noted by historians such as John Dower and Richard Frank, is Hirohito’s concern over domestic turmoil spurred by food shortages. That view was shared by Marquis Kido, the emperor’s closest adviser, who recognized that the effects of the Allied aerial and submarine blockade would peak in the fall.
261 “In dropping 161,000 tons”: The Allies dropped some 2.7 million tons in Europe, with nearly half falling on Germany: http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#josp, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, DC: Military Analysis Division, July 1946), 16.
262 targeting urban-industrial areas: Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 5: The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 643.
263 area bombing remained the only option: For discussions, see Stephen Budiansky, Air Power; Max Hastings, Bomber Command: The Myths and Reality of the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939–45 (New York: Dial, 1979); Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Kenneth P. Werrell, Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan During World War II (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996); and U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, “Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan’s War Economy.”
263 postwar analysis concluded: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, “Effects of Air Attack on Japan’s Urban Economy.” Washington, DC: 1946.
263 “The fire bomb raids”: Mission Accomplished, 24.
264 “From the defense point of view”: Ibid., 23.
266 “The final decision”: Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 5: The Pacific, 713.
267 Death