Why Leaders Lie - Mearsheimer, John J_ [48]
6. According to the United States Code, concealment is criminal behavior when it involves a “trick, scheme, or device.” In other words, there must be an “affirmative act of concealment.” See Kim, “False Statements,” 515. In my classification, such behavior would be akin to lying—indeed it would probably involve lying; it would not fit my definition of concealment, which does not involve an affirmative act.
7. Quoted in Albert Z. Carr, “Is Business Bluffing Ethical?” Harvard Business Review, January-February 1968, 143. For the case that bluffing in business transactions is not lying, see Thomas Carson, “Second Thoughts about Bluffing,” Business Ethics Quarterly 3, no. 4 (October 1993): 317–41. For the other side in this debate, see Gary E. Jones, “Lying and Intentions,” Journal of Business Ethics 5, no. 4 (August 1986): 347–49. See also Thomas L. Carson, “On the Definition of Lying: A Reply to Jones and Revisions,” Journal of Business Ethics 7, no. 7 (July 1998): 509–14.
Chapter 2
1. Although the focus in this book is on the creation and promotion of nationalist myths by individual states, there is no question that ethnic groups that do not have their own state—either because they have never had one or because they lost it—also tell lies about their past. Thus, some of my arguments about nationalist mythmaking apply to stateless nations as well as nation-states themselves.
2. This kind of selfish behavior was on display during the Iran-Contra scandal, when senior members of the Reagan administration were investigated and some were charged with breaking the law. See Eric Alterman, When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and Its Consequences (New York: Viking, 2004), chap. 5.
3. Threat deflation is another possible kind of strategic lie. In this case, a leader lies to his public to make a threat look less serious than it actually is. This behavior might come into play when a leader is determined to avoid war in the face of intense public pressure to the contrary. Threat deflation is not considered in this book, mainly because it rarely occurs.
Chapter 3
1. Quoted in J. A. Barnes, A Pack of Lies: Towards a Sociology of Lying (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 23.
2. Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), xxiii.
3. Quoted in Avishai Margalit, “The Violent Life of Yitzhak Shamir,” New York Review of Books, May 14, 1992, 23. Another Israeli prime minister, Moshe Sharett, once remarked: “I have learned that the state of Israel cannot be ruled in our generation without deceit and adventurism. These are historical facts that cannot be altered…. In the end, history will justify both the stratagems of deceit and the acts of adventurism. All I know is that I, Moshe Sharett, am not capable of them, and I am therefore unsuited to lead the country.” Quoted in Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 51–52.
4. Of course, this does not mean that leaders should axiomatically assume that foreign diplomats and statesman are lying to them, because that kind of paranoia would lead them to misread the many situations in which they are being told the truth. Stalin exhibited this kind of thinking in the spring of 1941, when he foolishly dismissed warnings from Churchill and others about an impending German attack on the Soviet Union. See Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982), 34–42; Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), chap. 8; Barton Whaley, Codeword BARBAROSSA (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974).
5. Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” World Politics 37, no.