Why Leaders Lie - Mearsheimer, John J_ [50]
15. Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World, Told from the Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York: Dell, 2000); Jeanne Guillemin, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Matthew Meselson et al., “The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979,” Science, November 18, 1994, 1202–8; Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001).
16. Quoted in Bullock, Hitler, 329. See also ibid., chap. 6; Ian Kershaw, The “Hitler Myth”: Image and Reality in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), chap. 5; Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1889–1936; Hubris (New York: Norton, 1999), chaps. 11–12; Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–45; Nemesis (New York: Norton, 2000), chap. 1; Mihalka, “German Strategic Deception.”
17. Quoted in Joachim C. Fest, Hitler, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), 556.
18. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 108. See also 33, 39, 46–47, 56, 86, 91–93, 190–91.
19. Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), 353–57; James P. Pfiffner, The Character Factor: How We Judge America’s Presidents (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2004), 22, 24.
20. Powell, Other Side of the Story, 225–32.
21. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), appendix 2, also available online at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/
trachtenberg/appendices/appendixII.html
22. Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 2:745. See also ibid., 2:678–745; David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), chap. 2; Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth, trans. Andrew and Eva Wilson (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1979), 96–128; L. C. F. Turner, Origins of the First World War (New York: Norton, 1970), 2–5. It appears that the Moroccan Crisis is the only known case of a country making an empty verbal threat for coercive purposes. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 213–16.
23. Bob Woodward, “Gadhafi Target of Secret U.S. Deception Plan,” Washington Post, October 2, 1986. See also Gerald M. Boyd, “The Administration Denies Planting Reports in the U.S.,” New York Times, October 3, 1986; Leslie H. Gelb, “Administration is Accused of Deceiving Press on Libya,” New York Times, October 3, 1986; Alex S. Jones, “Initial Report on Libyan Plots Stirred Skepticism,” New York Times, October 3, 1986; Jeffery T. Richelson, “Planning to Deceive: How the Defense Department Practices the Fine Art of Making Friends and Influencing People,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 2 (March/April 2003): 67–68.
24. After discussing the problems presented by strategic nuclear parity, Henry Kissinger writes, “The answer of our NATO friends to the situation I have described has invariably been to demand additional reassurances of an undiminished American military commitment. And I have sat around the NATO Council table in Brussels and elsewhere and have uttered the magic words which had a profoundly reassuring effect, and which permitted the Ministers to return home with a rationale for not increasing