Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [302]
The planners concluded that Western airpower could be used effectively against Soviet communications, but that “Russian industry is so dispersed that it is unlikely to be a profitable air target.” They proposed that 47 Anglo-American divisions might credibly be deployed in an offensive, 14 of these armoured. More than 40 divisions would have to be held back for defensive or occupation tasks. The Russians could meet an Allied thrust with 170 divisions of equivalent strength, 30 of them armoured. “It is difficult to assess to what extent our tactical air superiority and the superior handling of our forces will redress the balance, but the above odds would clearly render the launching of an offensive a hazardous undertaking.” The planners proposed two main thrusts, one on the northern axis Stettin-Schneidemühl-Bydgoszcz, the second in the south on an axis Leipzig-Poznań-Breslau. They concluded, “If we are to embark on war with Russia, we must be prepared to be committed to a total war, which will be both long and costly.”
They warned in an annexe that Moscow could probably call upon the aid of local Communists in France, Belgium and Holland to conduct an extensive campaign of sabotage against Western lines of communications. The word hazardous is used eight times in the planning document, to describe the proposed Anglo-American operations. Annexe IV addressed likely German attitudes to an invitation to participate in hostilities between Russia and the West: “The German General Staff and Officer Corps are likely to decide that their interests will be best served by siding with the Western Allies, although the extent to which they will be able to produce effective and active co-operation will probably be limited at first by the war-weariness of the German Army and of the civil population.” It was dryly suggested that German veterans who had fought on the Eastern Front might be reluctant to repeat the experience. However, addressing the issue of morale among Anglo-American soldiers invited to fight the Russians, the planners displayed astonishing optimism. They claimed that their men might be expected to fight with little diminution of the spirit they had displayed against the Germans—this, though Alexander in Italy had already annoyed the prime minister by reporting that his troops were reluctant to engage Tito’s Communists.
The Chiefs of Staff were never under any delusions about the military, never mind political, impracticability of launching an offensive against the Russians to liberate Poland. The CIGS wrote on May 24: “The idea is of course fantastic1095 and the chances of success quite impossible. There is no doubt that from now onwards Russia is all-powerful in Europe.” On the thirty-first, the Chiefs “again discussed the ‘unthinkable war’1096 against Russia … and became more convinced than ever that it is ‘unthinkable!’” The debate cannot have failed to rouse, in the minds of those privy to the secret, echoes of 1918–19, when Churchill insisted upon committing to Russia an abortive Allied military expedition designed to reverse the verdict of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution.
Passing the planners’ report to the prime minister on June 8, Ismay wrote: “In the attached report1097 on Operation ‘UNTHINKABLE,’ the Chiefs of Staff have set out the bare facts, which they can elaborate in discussion with you, if you so desire. They felt that the less was put on paper on this subject the better.” The Chiefs themselves appended a comment to the report: “Our view is … that once hostilities began, it would be beyond our power to win a quick but limited success and we should be committed to a protracted war against heavy odds. These odds, moreover, would become fanciful if the Americans grew weary and indifferent and began to be drawn away by the magnet of the Pacific war.”
Churchill responded on June 10:
If the Americans withdraw to their zone and move the bulk