Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [303]
In the original draft of this note, Churchill’s final words were “a highly improbable event.” He altered these in his familiar red ink, to make implementation of Unthinkable seem remoter still.
On July 11, the Chiefs’ Joint Planning Committee responded to the prime minister’s enquiries about the implications of a possible Soviet advance to the Channel, following demobilisation of Eisenhower’s armies. Russian naval strength, they concluded, was too limited to render an early amphibious invasion of Britain likely. They ruled out a Soviet airborne assault. It seemed more likely, they suggested, that Moscow would resort to intensive rocket bombardment, on a scale more destructive than that of the German V-1s and V-2s. To provide effective defence against a long-term Russian threat, they estimated that 230 squadrons of fighters, 100 of tactical bombers and 200 of heavy bombers would be necessary.
The Unthinkable file was closed a few days later, when another cable arrived from Truman. He rejected the arguments for renouncing or even delaying Anglo-American withdrawal to the occupation zones agreed to at Yalta. Washington had decided there was no case. The prime minister was obliged to recognise that there was not the slightest possibility that the Americans would lead an attempt to drive the Russians from Poland by force, nor even threaten Moscow that they might do so. It was also unimaginable that Churchill’s own government and fellow countrymen would have supported such action. In June 1945, his perception of the Soviet Union was light-years apart from that of his nation. Most British people were much less impressed by the perils facing Poland than by the wartime achievement of their Russian comrades-in-arms, whom they had learned to regard with enthusiasm. Churchill was obliged hereafter to undertake a dramatic reversal of view. If the Western Allies could not liberate Poland by force, then a new political attempt must be made to persuade Stalin to compromise about its future. Turning aside from his brief dalliance with Unthinkable, the prime minister committed himself to renewed efforts to exploit his supposed relationship with Stalin in pursuit of Polish interests.
It was fortunate for Churchill’s reputation that his speculation about confronting Russia in arms was not revealed in detail for another half century. In the years following the end of the war, it became progressively apparent to the Chiefs of Staff, and to the Western world, that it was necessary for the Western Allies to adopt the strongest possible defensive measures against further Soviet aggression in Europe. On August 30, 1946, Field Marshal “Jumbo” Maitland Wilson reported from Washington that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had become sufficiently fearful of possible conflict with the Russians to favour commencing military planning for such a contingency. In London, the Unthinkable file was taken1098 out and dusted down. Military preparations for a conflict with the Soviet Union became a staple of the Cold War, though at no time was it ever deemed politically acceptable or militarily practicable to attempt to free eastern Europe by force of arms. In May and June 1945, Churchill’s warrior instincts were still astonishingly powerful. But the society in which he lived had only just sufficient ardour to finish the Japanese war. There was none whatsoever for engaging new enemies,