You Did What__ Mad Plans and Great Historical Disasters - Bill Fawcett [96]
Within hours, on November 5, the newly certified U.S. Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (Airborne) was on full alert and plans were being drawn up for a rescue. Colonel Charles Beckwith was the man in command and he immediately saw the complications. Tehran was landlocked, not near any airports, and U.S. intelligence information within the country was scarce and unreliable. With the world spotlight on Washington, it also meant operating in secret, making things much more difficult.
Khomeini, playing to the same world stage, agreed six days later to free female, African-American, and non–U.S. citizen hostages. After that, fifty-three people remained, including, as it turned out, two women and one African American.
Penelope Laingen, wife of hostage Bruce Laingen, chargé d’affaires of the embassy, tied a yellow ribbon around a tree at her Maryland home that December. Her gesture captured Americans’ imaginations and millions followed her lead.
And as 1979 became 1980, things remained at a standstill. America refused the demands and tightened the fiscal screws. Khomeini’s followers continued the protests, refusing to let anyone else go free.
At first, Carter was praised for being a calm leader, but as winter turned to spring, people were getting tired of the statesman. Caucuses and early primaries were being held and the spotlight never left Iran. People wanted their president to do something beyond speeches. Hawks in Congress wanted a military approach from the outset, but Carter preferred diplomacy. Despite that public stance, the Pentagon had long before begun work on just such a plan. Finally, after months of haggling and delay, on April 11, Carter approved Operation Eagle Claw, sending in troops to free the hostages.
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the assistant to the president for national security affairs, led the White House group in favor of military action. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance disagreed and ultimately resigned his post. Brzezinski saw this as America’s own version of the successful hostage rescue raids at Mogadishu and Entebbe. Delta Force commander Beckwith disagreed, saying, “Logistically speaking it would be a bear. There were the vast distances, nearly 1,000 miles, of Iranian wasteland that had to be crossed, then the assault itself, against a heavily guarded building complex stuck in the middle of a city of 4,000,000 hostile folks. This was not going to be any Entebbe or Mogadishu. Nothing could be more difficult.”
Beckwith did approve a plan that called for eight helicopters (USMC RH-53s), twelve planes (four MC-130s for refueling, three EC-130s, three AC-130s, and two C-141s), and numerous operators placed within Tehran ahead of the actual assault. In the days prior to the mission, which was to be based out of Wadi Kena in Egypt, the various vehicles required for the mission were in use, creating an “operational footprint.” This would help allay suspicion that the military was on the move.
Training, involving all four branches of the armed services, had begun the previous fall and lasted for 172 days before Carter approved the plan. Obstacles along the way included finding a practical refueling system, which ultimately relied on an older system that had been abandoned. The various aircrews had practiced using the Night Observation Goggles (NOG), still in its infancy. The first MH-53 navy pilots were replaced since they were slow to adapt to the NOGs, but also given their inferior flying tactics. Given their more aggressive approach to flying, marine corp pilots were selected to fly the insertion parts of the mission. Air force pilots served as backup crews, navigating and en route flying.
Like the refueling