You Did What__ Mad Plans and Great Historical Disasters - Bill Fawcett [97]
A CIA Twin Otter flew into Iran in March, landing at a spot marked Desert One, with an operative planting landing lights to help guide the forces. It was noted that at 3,000 feet radar was detected but nothing below that altitude. They could land unseen.
On the first night, the plan was to have three MC-130s fly to a barren spot in Iran and offload the Delta Force men, combat controllers, and translators and truck drivers. Three EC-130s would then land and prepare to refuel the marine RH-53s flying in from the U.S. carrier Nimitz. Once refueled, the choppers would fly the task force to a spot near Tehran and meet up with the in-country agents, who would lead the operators to a safe house to await the assault the next night. All this flying would be accomplished by “weaving” carefully in between radar tower nodes. The second night would have the MC-130s and EC-130s fly once more into Iran, with one hundred Rangers, headed for Manzariyeh Airfield, which had been built by the shah as a viewing stand for air shows and had therefore been abandoned during his exile. The Rangers would attack while the C-141s would land and transport the hostages back to safe soil.
Nothing went as planned.
On the evening of April 24, the six C-130s left Masirah Island, Oman, and eight RH-53D helicopters departed the USS Nimitz in the Arabian Sea.
Two of the helicopters, flying below two hundred feet to be safe from detection, got caught in sandstorms and had to land, as did a third when its warning light went on. Later they described the experience as “flying in a bowl of milk.” Collecting the crew from the third helicopter meant the plane was now twenty minutes behind the formation.
The remaining helicopters continued toward Desert One. Word was relayed that the planes and fuel had landed safely so the two grounded choppers lifted off and proceeded to the rendezvous. Yet another helicopter, though, developed a malfunction, grounding it. That left six choppers, the minimum allowed in the plan. Three of the helicopters arrived an hour behind schedule, with the final three turning up seventy-five minutes late. One of them had developed a hydraulic system failure, forcing the mission to be aborted since they were below the operational minimum of six helicopters.
If that wasn’t bad enough, after the abort was called one of the helicopters drifted toward a parked plane, intending to refuel. The pilot couldn’t see the plane since his rotors kicked up so much sand that visibility was dangerously reduced. The helicopter and plane collided, both going up in flames. Orders were given to evacuate the men, destroy the helicopters and leave the country. While wounded men were removed from the area, the helicopters were never destroyed. Despite their best rescue efforts, five members of the air force and three marines perished. The dead and $193 million in equipment were abandoned.
The following day, Iranian soldiers investigated the crash site and found the vehicles, still intact. They recovered the secret U.S. plans, which nearly cost the Delta operatives their lives. Additionally, the students split the hostages up, preventing future attempts. Khomeini’s people crowed about their success against America’s highly vaunted army, and in retrospect that failure ended Carter’s hopes for a second term.
What went wrong? First an anguished president asked that question, then the public and finally Congress, with extensive hearings.
Studying the failure, the Pentagon learned they were insufficiently prepared despite nearly six months of training. The weather information was inaccurate; the estimate of a twenty-minute flight was off by five hours; and it was learned that many of the marine pilots lacked the skills necessary to complete the mission. In one case, unfamiliarity with