China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [158]
55 ZGTJZY 2000, 62.
56 Research Institute of the State Tax Administration, ”Guanyu woguo shuishou fudan wenti zaiyanjiu” (A Second Look at the Issue of the Tax Burden in China) ,.fingji yanjiu cankao 17 (1998): 3.
57 The municipal governments’ share of funds increased as well, but the authors of the study did not disclose the precise magnitude. They simply suggested that in 2001 municipal governments declared a surplus of more than 13 billion yuan. See Jia Kang and Bai Jingmin, ”Jiceng caizheng kunnan zai nali” (What Are the Difficulties in Local Public Finance?), Gaigeneican 15 (2002): 23.
58 Fan Liming and Wang Dongni, ”Woguo difang caizheng zhichu jiegou shizheng fenxi” (An Empirical Analysis of the Structure of China’s Local Fiscal Expenditures), Gaige 3 (2001): 72.
59 Xiang Huaicheng, ”Dangqian de caizheng gongzuo yu caizheng gaige” (Current Fiscal Tasks and Reform), Zhonggong Zhongyang dangxiao baogaoxuan 4 (1999): 8.
60 BYTNB 11 (1999): 5.
61 Su Ming, ”Woguo xianxiang caizheng wenti de fenxi yu zhengce jianyi” (The Problem of County and Township Finance: Analysis and Policy Recommendations), Neibu cankao 39 (2002): 19.
62 Su Ming, ”Zhongguo nongcun jichu jiaoyu de caizheng zhichi zhengee yanjiu,” 45.
63 He Xuefeng and Xiang Jiquan, ”Huaijie cunji zhaiwu de ganga” (Resolving the Difficulties in Village Indebtedness), Gaigeneican 11 (2002): 22-23.
64 He Junwei, ”Xiangcun zhaiwu wenti de xianzhuang chengyin ji duice” (Township and Village Debts: The Status, Causes, and Policies), Jingji yaocan 45 (2002): 9.
65 www.chinanews.com.cn, November 29, 2004.
66 He Junwei, ”Xiangcun zhaiwu wenti de xianzhuang chengyin ji duice,” 10.
67 BYTNB 9 (2000): 14.
68 BYTNB 5 (2001): 37.
69 He Junwei, ”Xiangcun zhaiwu wenti dc xianzhuang chengyin ji duice,” 9.
70 Quan Junliang, ”Xiangcun yanzhong fuzhai de chengyin ji zhili” (The Causes of and Solution to the Heavy Debts Incurred by Townships and Villagcs), Jingji yanjiu cankao 114 (2000): 37-38.
71 Zhao Limin et al., ”Jiakuai tuijin nongcun shuifei gaige de nandian he duice” (On the Difficulties and Policies in Accelerating the Implementation of Tax and Fee Reforms in the Countryside), Jingji yanjiu cankao 74 (2002): 34.
72 BYTNB 9 (2000): 23.
73 He Junwei, ”Xiangcun zhaiwu wenti de xianzhuang chengyin ji duice,” 10.
74 Zhao Shukai, a DRC researcher, argued that the collapse of public finance in rural areas is a principal cause of the increasing conflict between peasants and local governments. See Zhao Shukai, ”Xiangcun zhili: Zuzhi he chongtu” (Rural Governance: Organization and Conflict), Zhanlüe yu guanli 6 (2003): 1-8.
75 Quan Junliang, ”Xiangcun yanzhong fuzhai de chengyin ji zhili,” 39.
76 In Xiangtan city in Hunan, 25 percent of township officials reported they would like to seek other positions. Chu Guoliang, ”Xiangzhcn zhengfu de caizheng heidong” (The Black Hole in the Finance of Township Governments), Gaigeneican 5 (2002): 6.
77 Research Institute of the Ministry of Finance, ”Xiangzhen caizheng chizi yu zhaiwu yanjiu baogao” (Research Report on the Deficits and Debts of Townships), Jingji yanjiu cankao 78 (2002): 2-8.
78 Samuel Huntington, ”Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems,” in Huntington and Clement Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynanamics of Established One-Party Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 4, 9.
79 In village elections, individuals who have demonstrated economic success have a better chance of getting elected to villagers’ committees. In Zhejiang province, 30 percent of villagers’ committee members were successful wealthy peasants and private entrepreneurs. Fan Ping, ”2003