China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [159]
80 The withdrawal by the Chinese state from providing critical social services has been extensively documented. See Li Junpeng, Gonggong fuwuxing zhengfu(Public Service Oriented Government) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004). For the decline of government-provided social services in the countryside, see Center for Economic Studies of the Ministry of Agriculture, Zhongguo nongcun yanjiu baogao 2000 (Research Report on Rural China) (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng chubanshe, 2001).
81 See Zhao Shukai, ”Xiangcun zhili: Zuzhi he chongtu,” 1-8.
82 This is evident in the collapse of the Communist Youth League in rural China. A survey conducted by the league’s organization in Xiangtan city in Hunan in 1999 found that 90 percent of the villages did not have a league cell. Since the CCP recruits from the league, the collapse of the league does not bode well for the party. See Huang Ren, ”Jiceng tuan zuzhi mianlin de wenti burong hushi” (The Problems Faced by the League’s Grassroots Organization Cannot Be Ignored), Neibu canyue (Internal Reference), October 27, 1999, 19-23.
83 Sichuan CCP POD, ”Zhendui pinkun diqu tedian jinyibu jiaqiang nongcun jiceng zuzhi jianshc” (Target the Special Characteristics of Poor Areas and Further Strengthen the Building of Rural Grassroots Organizations), Dangjian yanjiu neican (Party-Building Research Internal Reference)7 (1998): 11. Although there are no official data on how many CCP members have left the countryside for the cities, sociologists estimate that 120 million rural residents migrated to urban areas between 1978 and 2002. The CCP members account for 3.75 percent of the general rural population. Thus, at least 4.5 million CCP members have left the countryside. The actual number of CCP member migrants is likely much larger because brighter prospects in urban areas should attract more party members. The estimate of rural migrants is from Fan Ping, ”2003 nian Zhongguo nongmin fazhan de jiben zhuangkuang,” 304.
84 Shanxi CCP POD, ”Guanyu dangyuan duiwu jiegou fenxi ji shutong dangyuan duiwu chukou wenti de diaoyan baogao” (An Investigative Research Report on the Structure of Party Members and the Issue of the Exit of Party Members), in ZGYW, 53.
85 BYTNB 7 (2001): 8.
86 The time of the survey was not identified. See Lu Xianfu, ”Dangxian dangde jianshe de jige zhongda wenti” (Several Major Issues in Party-Building Today), Lilun dongtai (Theoretical Development)1531 (2001): 13.
87 Li Jing and Cheng Wei, ”Tingchan bantingchan qiye dangyuan guanli qingkuang diaocha” (An Investigation into the Management of Party Members in Enterprises That Have Ceased or Partially Ceased Operation), Dangjian yanjin (Party-Building Research) 2 (1998): 38.
88 Shanxi CCP POD, ”Guanyu dangyuan duiwu jiegou fenxi ji shutong dangyuan duiwu chukou wenti de diaoyan baogao,” 53.
89 Other than trying to assert its control, the CCP’s motives for trying to penetrate the private sector remain puzzling because Bruce Dickson’s research shows that Chinese private entrepreneurs do not constitute a threat to the party. See Dickson, Red Capitalists in China.
90 Li Li‘an, ”Zai feigongyouzhi qiyezhong kaizhan dangjian gongzuo zhi wojian” (My Views on Implementing Party-Building Efforts in Non-State-Owned Enterprises), Dangjian yanjiu neican (Internal Research Reference on Party-Building) 4 (2002): 1.
91 In Guangdong’s 7,301 civic associations, the party had cells in only 1.3 percent of them in 2000; the party had only one cell in Beijing’s 1,140 private clinics and hospitals. In Beijing’s private service firms, only 1.8 percent of the employees were CCP members. Institute of Party-Building Research of the CCP COD, cd., ”Shehui zhongjic zuzhi dangjian gongzuo qingkuang diaocha” (Investigation of the Status of the Party-Building Work in Intermediating Social Organizations), Dangjian yanjiu neican7 (2002): 8.
92 Shanghai CCP POD reported that only