China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [161]
115 BYTNB 2 (2000): 8-12; BYTNB 1 (2001): 40-42.
116 The most informative description is Li Changping’s Wo xiang zongli shuo shihua (I Toldthe Premierthe Truth) (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshc, 2002). Li was a party secretary in a Hubei township. In his book, he described political decay and economic difficulties in rural China in the most stark terms.
117 No. 4 Research Institute of the MPS, ”Woguo fasheng quntixing shijian de diaocha yu sikao,” 21.
118 Shen Zelin, ”Yingxiang dangqian nongcun wending fazhan de zhuyao yinsu” (The Main Factors That Affect Rural Stability and Development), Shehuixue(Sociology) 2 (2001): 52.
119 Peasant protests against local governments’ expropriation of land replaced tax revolts as the focus of rural discontent in the first decade of the new century. See Xiaolin Guo, ”Land Expropriation and Rural Conflicts in China,” The ChinaQuarterly166 (2001): 422-439. Yu Jianrong’s study found that, of the 22,304 viewers’ calls to China Central TV, complaints about land issues totaled 15,312, making the land issue the most salient rural problem. See Yu Jianrong, ”Tudi wenti yichengwei nongmin weiquan kangzheng de jiaodian” (The Land Issue Has Become the Focus of the Peasants’ Resistance and Struggle in the Defense of Their Rights) (Beijing: Institute of Rural Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2004).
120 Zhang Xuhong, ”Woguo nongmin shouru de xianzhuang yu duice” (Peasant Income in China: The Current Status and Policy Options), Jingji yanjiu cankao 62 (2001): 18.
121 NFZM, March 29, 2002; ZGTJZY 2000 (China Statistical Abstract), 84. Rural income is augmented by income from nonagricultural production, with about 30 percent of rural income in 1999 derived from wage income of migrant laborers. www.chinanews.com.cn, January 19, 2003.
122 For an analysis of the constraints on increasing rural income, see Project on Peasant Income, ”Zengjia nongmin shouru de shida zhiyue” (Ten Major Constraints on Increasing Peasant Income), Zhongguo nongcun yanjiu (ChinaRural Research) 6 (2002): 1-12.
123 Wang, Hu, and Ding, ”Jingji fanrong beihou de shehui buwending,” 27.
124 Li Changping, Wo xiang zongli shuo shihua, 21.
125 Cui Xiaoli, ”Woguo nongcun shuifei zhengshou cunzai de wenti ji gaige jianyi” (Collection of Taxes and Fees in China’s Rural Areas: Existing Problems and Recommendations for Reform), DRC diaocha yanjiu baogao 54 (2002): 5.
126 See Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu, Taxation Without Representation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Another notable source of tensions is the dispute between the peasantry and the government over land acquisitions by the state. In Hunan, disputes over land acquisitions and compensation were among the top eight issues that triggered peasant petitions to government. BYTNB 1 (2002): 5-7.
127 Li Tianzi and Li Haifeng, ”Jixu zhongshi jiejue nongmin fudanzhong de wenti” (Continue to Pay Attention to and Solve the Problem of Heavy Peasant Burdens), Dangjian yanjiu neican 6 (1999): 13-14.
128 The total amount in taxes and fees paid by the agrarian sector was about 10 percent of rural GDP, with 2.63 percent in taxes and 7.43 percent in authorized levies and fees. Illegal fees and levies amount to an additional 10 percent of rural GDP. Research Institute of the State Tax Administration, ”Guanyu woguo shuishou fudan wenti zaiyanjiu,” 20; Research Institute of the Ministry of Finance, ”Xiangzheng caizheng chizi yu zhaiwu yanjiu baogao,” 6.
129 Shcn Zelin, ”Yingxiang dangqian nongcun wending fazhan dc zhuyao yinsu,” 51.
130 See Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu, ”Taxation Without Representation: Peasants, the Central and the Local States in Reform China,” The China Quarterly 163 (2000): 742-763.
131 Li and Li, ”Jixu zhongshi jiejue nongmin fudanzhong de wenti,” 13-14.
132 Institute of Macroeconomic Research, State Planning Commission, ”Zhongguo jumin shehui xintai genzong fenxi” (Tracking