Intelligence_ From Secrets to Policy - Mark M. Lowenthal [113]
————. Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978. 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979.
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning. Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives. 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978.
_______. Nomination of Robert M. Gates. 3 vols. 102d Cong., 1st sess., 1991. 1.
———. Nomination of Robert M. Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence. 102d Cong., 1st sess., 1991.
.Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. 108th Cong., 2d sess., 2004.
Wirtz, James J. “Miscalculation, Surprise, and American Intelligence after the Cold War.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5 (spring 1991): 1-16.
______. The Tel Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. 1.
CHAPTER 7
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) refers to efforts taken to protect one’s own intelligence operations from penetration and disruption by hostile nations or their intelligence services. It is both analytical and operational. Counterintelligence is not a separate step in the intelligence process. CI should pervade all aspects of intelligence, but it is often pigeon-holed as a security issue. CI does not fit neatly with human intelligence, although CI is, in part, a collection issue. Nor does it fit with covert action. It is also more than security—that is, defending against or identifying breaches—because successful CI can also lead to analytical and operational opportunities. In sum, CI is one of the most difficult intelligence topics to discuss.
Most nations have intelligence enterprises of some sort. As a result, these agencies are valuable intelligence targets for other nations. Knowing what the other side knows, does not know, and how it goes about its work is always useful. Moreover, knowing if the other side is undertaking similar efforts is extremely helpful. (See box, “Who Spies on Whom?”)
However, counterintelligence is more than a defensive activity. There are at least three types of CI.
• Collection: gaining information about an opponent’s intelligence collection capabilities that may be aimed at one’s own country
• Defensive: thwarting efforts by hostile intelligence services to penetrate one’s service
• Offensive: having identified an opponent’s efforts against one’s own system, trying to manipulate these attacks either by turning the opponent’s agents into double agents or by feeding them false information that they report home
The world of spy and counterspy is murky at best. Like espionage, counterintelligence is a staple of intelligence fiction. But, like all other aspects of intelligence, it has less glamour than it does grinding, painstaking work.
INTERNAL SAFEGUARDS
All intelligence agencies establish a series of internal processes and checks, the main purposes of which are to weed out applicants who may be unsuitable and to identify current employees whose loyalty or activities are questionable. The vetting process for applicants includes extensive background checks, interviews with the applicants and close associates, and, in the United States at least, the use of the polygraph at most agencies. The ideal candidate is not necessarily someone whose past record is spotless. Most applicants likely have engaged in some level of experimentation—either sexual or drugs, or both. Some may have committed minor criminal offenses. It is crucial, however, that applicants be forthcoming about their past and be able to prove that they are no longer exhibiting behaviors that are criminal, dangerous, or susceptible to blackmail.
WHO SPIES ON WHOM?
Some people assume that friendly spy agencies do not spy on one another But what constitutes “friendly”? The United States and its “Commonwealth cousins”—Australia. Britain, and Canada—enjoy a close intelligence partnership and do not spy on one another. Beyond that, all bets are off
In the 1990s, the United States allegedly spied on France for economic intelligence.