Superfreakonomics_ global cooling, patri - Steven D. Levitt [102]
write a chapter in SuperFreakonomics on how talent is acquired—that is, when a person is very good at a given thing, what is it that makes him or her so good? But our plans changed when several books were recently published on this theme. A lot of people gave generously of their time and thoughts in our reporting on this abandoned chapter, and we remain indebted to them. Anders Ericsson was extremely helpful, as were Werner Helsen, Paula Barnsley, Gus Thompson, and many others. We are especially grateful to Takeru Kobayashi, the competitive-eating champion from Japan, for his time, insights, and willingness during a New York visit to try out a Papaya King hot dog as well as a Hebrew National, even though he’s not particularly fond of hot dogs except when he’s eating eight or ten of them per minute. It was the ultimate busman’s holiday, and Kobayashi could not have been more gracious.
WHO BECOMES A TERRORIST? See Alan B. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist (Princeton University Press, 2007); Claude Berrebi, “Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians,” Princeton University Industrial Relations Section working paper, 2003; and Krueger and Jita Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 (Fall 2003). / 63 For more on terrorists’ goals, see Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (University of California Press, 2001). / 63–64 Terrorism hard to define: see “Muslim Nations Fail to Define Terrorism,” Associated Press, April 3, 2002.
WHY TERRORISM IS SO CHEAP AND EASY: The murder count in the Washington, D.C., metro area was provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which collects crime statistics from local police departments. The Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Statistical Area includes the district itself and surrounding counties in Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia. For more on the impact of the Washington sniper attacks, see Jeffrey Schulden et al., “Psychological Responses to the Sniper Attacks: Washington D.C., Area, October 2002,” American Journal of Preventative Medicine 31, no. 4 (October 2006). / 65 Figures for airport security screenings come from the Federal Bureau of Transportation Statistics. / 65 Financial impact of 9/11: see Dick K. Nanto, “9/11 Terrorism: Global Economic Costs,” Congressional Research Service, 2004. / 65–66 Extra driving deaths after 9/11: see Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kadiyali, and Daniel Simon, “Driving Fatalities after 9/11: A Hidden Cost of Terrorism,” Cornell University Department of Applied Economics and Management working paper, 2005; Gerd Gigerenzer, “Dread Risk, September 11, and Fatal Traffic Accidents,” Psychological Science 15, no. 4 (2004); Michael Sivak and Michael J. Flannagan, “Consequences for Road Traffic Fatalities of the Reduction in Flying Following September 11, 2001,” Transportation Research 7, nos. 4–5 (July–September 2004); and Jenny C. Su et al., “Driving Under the Influence (of Stress): Evidence of a Regional Increase in Impaired Driving and Traffic Fatalities After the September 11 Terrorist Attacks,” Psychological Science 20, no. 1 (December 2008). / 66 Back-dated stock options: see Mark Maremont, Charles Forelle, and James Bandler, “Companies Say Backdating Used in Days After 9/11,” The Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2007. / 66 Police resources shifted to terrorism: see Selwyn Raab, Five Families: The Rise, Decline and Resurgence of America’s Most Powerful Mafia Empires (Macmillan, 2005); Janelle Nanos, “Stiffed,” New York, November 6, 2006; Suzy Jagger, “F.B.I. Diverts Anti-Terror