The Coke Machine - Michael Blanding [138]
Before the lawyers could file, Collingsworth received a call from Ed Potter, whom he knew through D.C. labor law circles. Now just a year into his position, Potter asked if perhaps there was a way they could work out a settlement. At his insistence, the two sides engaged a retired judge in San Francisco, Daniel Weinstein, to act as a formal mediator in their talks. The two sides drew up a “term sheet” on August 17, 2006, agreeing they would use their “best efforts” to finalize a settlement within six weeks. In broad terms, the settlement would include cash compensation for the victims in Colombia along with a new workers’ rights policy by the company to prevent future violations. In exchange, the lawyers would call off the dogs, including Ray Rogers’s campaign maligning Coke.
Collingsworth told Potter that while he wouldn’t be able to curtail campaigning by Rogers while negotiations ensued—or USAS or Srivastava for that matter—he could promise that as an act of good faith SINALTRAINAL would suspend its campaign and refrain from publicly criticizing Coke as they talked out a settlement. That promise was a hasty one—and in the end, a fatal one for the union’s case.
Instead of the promised six weeks, the negotiations dragged on for the next eighteen months. And once the union’s biggest weapon—its voice in the campaign—was taken away, it lost the leverage to make strong demands of the company. The negotiations unfolded under a strict cloak of confidentiality, and both sides’ lawyers are still prohibited from revealing what was discussed. Documents from the settlement talks, however, reveal the extent of the gap between the union’s and Coke’s goals—and how aggressively Coke was willing to protect its image.
Whether through misunderstanding or willful disregard for the agreement, SINALTRAINAL resumed criticizing Coke on its website. After all, Coke was destroying the union with its increasing use of contract workers, union leaders reasoned, and the death threats continued to appear at their union halls. If Coke wasn’t going to stop the paramilitaries from threatening them, why should they keep their mouths shut? Immediately, Coke’s lawyers protested to Judge Weinstein, who blasted back from his BlackBerry that both sides refrain from public statements until he had a draft of the settlement on his desk by the first week of October 2006. Despite a flurry of conference calls and e-mails among Collingsworth, Kovalik, and Coke’s lawyers, SINALTRAINAL continued to distribute flyers and post messages to its site about its ongoing campaign, and Coke trolled Web and newspaper reports for even the slightest notice of disparagement that it could use to hold over the union’s head with the judge.
As the two sides pushed closer to agreement in October, Coke made clear its goal was to stop the bad publicity against the company, refusing any admission of liability in the torture or murder cases. Furthermore, it insisted SINALTRAINAL agree to never campaign internationally against Coke again. In fact, in a draft of the settlement, it required that the union