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By Root 612 0

scrub Internet search engines and archives to get rid of any mention of Killer Coke—as if the campaign never existed. For its part, Coke would pay just over $12 million to the union, including $1 million for Isidro Gil’s heirs, and $4 million to be divided among Correa, Galvis, Flores, Garcia, and González. The bulk of the rest would go into a $6 million fund for victims of trade union violence, jointly administered by Coke’s foundation and the union representatives; Collingsworth and Kovalik would receive $2 million in escrow to cover “administrative fees” for their part in managing the fund. Finally, the company would agree to a new workers’ rights policy—but only for full-time workers, not contract workers—and a confidential “global forum” four times a year in which Coke would meet to discuss ongoing labor issues.

And then there was one more thing, added by Coke’s lawyers: In order for the employees to get their money, they would have to resign from the union.

When the agreement arrived in Colombia, it was met with disbelief by Javier Correa and the rest of SINALTRAINAL’s leadership. If Coke wanted them to stop talking about past cases such as Gil’s murder, that was fine, but how could they refrain from criticizing the company for abuses that hadn’t occurred yet? And resigning from the union? In their minds, the court case, the campaign, the negotiations—all of it—was an attempt to save the union. That requirement would defeat the entire purpose of the agreement.

Frustrated with the stalled talks, SINALTRAINAL went on the offensive, sending representatives to participate in a tour in Germany called, without subtlety, “Coke Kills.” Coke’s lawyers hit the roof. “Every request we made for . . . the immediate cessation of anti-Coke hostilities—was met with an attitude that borders on ‘who cares,’” Coke’s outside lawyer Faith Gay wrote to Collingsworth in November. “Obviously this is the primary issue that we do care about. Non-disparagement is why we are paying money to your clients.” As far as the company was concerned, she accused the union of not negotiating in good faith. “To be frank, we believe that plaintiffs are unwilling to disarm for internal political reasons and because they know no other means of interacting with their employer(s).”

To prove they meant business, Coke’s lawyers filed a motion with Weinstein demanding he fine SINALTRAINAL $150,000 for breach of the term sheet. Furthermore, it demanded he force Rogers to end his campaign as well. Weinstein didn’t go for it, but he did order the union to pay $120,000 in penalties. As frustrated as Coke was getting with the union, Collingsworth was getting just as frustrated. “Look, don’t waste my time,” he told his clients. “If there is an internal political reason why there’s not ever going to be a deal, tell me now.” Correa responded that the union was willing to negotiate—if Coke would give it some assurances that it could stop eroding the union both through use of contract workers and through threats by paramilitaries.

In April 2007, the negotiating team headed to Atlanta to try one last time to strike an agreement. Serving as a translator for the group, Camilo Romero admits to feeling intimidated as he headed down with Collingsworth and Kovalik into the “lions’ den”: the penthouse suite of Atlanta’s King & Spalding Building. Accompanying them was the union’s team of negotiators: president Javier Correa, international relations head Edgar Paez, and secretary/treasurer Duban Velez. And also along for the ride was Ray Rogers.

Even as the union had begun its protracted talks with Coke, Rogers had not been idle. He was hot on the trail of a contract at the 35,000-student University of Alberta when Collingsworth called to tell him he’d eventually have to end his campaign if negotiations went according to plan. Rogers was fine with that, he said. “But first, tell me, what did we win?” As he caught wind of the details, he, too, was incredulous. No admission of guilt, no assurances the union would continue, no promise of dealing with subcontracting, and a comparatively